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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The unique and haphazard evolution of immigration law has con-
tributed to its irregularities, idiosyncrasies, and chaos.  Scholars have 
described it in ways that range from “a constitutional oddity”1 to an 
area of law that “has been so radically insulated and divergent from 
those fundamental norms of constitutional right, administrative pro-
cedure, and judicial role that animate the rest of our legal system.”2 
This Comment will examine the impact that the Immigration and 
Nationality Act’s provision governing judicial review of orders of re-
moval has on the success of constitutional claims in federal court 
such as Bivens claims.  The provision governing judicial review of or-
ders of removal, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9), makes judicial review of all 
questions of fact and law arising out of an action of removal available 
only in review of a final order.3  Effectively, § 1252(b)(9) acts as a 
“zipper clause,” forwarding all claims that have been administratively 
exhausted to the federal appellate courts.4  The provision was in-
tended to resolve certain procedural and administrative redundan-
cies presented in removal proceedings, such as aliens being able to 
 
 * J.D. Candidate, 2010, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.S. 2005, Duke Univer-
sity.  Special thanks to Frank Goodman and Shane Cargo. 
 1 Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressional Power, 1984 
SUP. CT. REV. 255, 255. 
 2 Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1 (1984)). 
 3 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) (2006) (“Judicial review of all questions of law and fact, including 
interpretation and application of constitutional and statutory provisions, arising from any 
action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien from the United States under this 
subchapter shall be available only in judicial review of a final order under this section.  
Except as otherwise provided in this section, no court shall have jurisdiction, by habeas 
corpus under section 2241 of title 28 or any other habeas corpus provision, by section 
1361 or 1651 of such title, or by any other provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory), to 
review such an order or such questions of law or fact.”). 
 4 See Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 483 (1999). 
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file separate proceedings challenging the denial of a stay of deporta-
tion and  challenging the deportation order itself.5  By consolidating 
review into one forum, Congress solved the problem of “successive 
filings and . . . backdoor challenges” to removal orders.6  The provi-
sion, where applicable, only requires exhaustion of administrative 
procedures and the consolidation of claims for judicial review.7  It is 
not intended to eliminate the right to review altogether.8  In practice, 
however, district and circuit courts have found interpreting the 
phrase “arising out of an action of removal” to be challenging. 
This Comment will examine whether § 1252(b)(9) bars Bivens and 
similar constitutional claims in federal court.  While the focus of the 
Comment will be on Bivens claims, the same discussion and analysis 
applies equally to other constitutional claims.  Because most of these 
claims arise out of the same sets of facts and circumstances, though 
they may be wholly separate from the underlying removal proceed-
ing, the issue of whether such claims are barred by § 1252(b)(9) is 
muddled. 
Courts currently bar a variety of Bivens and constitutional claims 
for several reasons.9  However, the lack of uniformity in the determi-
nation of these cases does not address the reservations Congress had 
when it enacted § 1252(b)(9).  In order to adhere to the intent of 
Congress in enacting the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) and Real ID Act, courts may have to insti-
tute a uniform analytical method to the jurisdictional bar. 
To quell backdoor challenges, successive filings, and redundant 
judicial findings, Congress has dictated that district courts should bar 
review of claims that are significantly, factually tied to removal pro-
ceedings so that they cannot be considered collateral to the underly-
ing proceeding.  While a great deal of scholarly work has focused on 
the effects of these limitations on the writ of habeas corpus and re-
lated proceedings, the main focus of this Comment is on examining 
the effects of the general consolidation provisions contained in the 
IIRIRA and § 1252(b)(9), and on providing a coherent methodology 
for analyzing the issue.  The standard proposed for court use to assess 
 
 5 See Aguilar v. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 510 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 
2007) (“In enacting section 1252(b)(9), Congress plainly intended to put an end to 
the scattershot and piecemeal nature of the review process that previously had held 
sway in regard to removal proceedings.”). 
 6 See Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 270 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (citing Calcano-
Martinez v. INS, 232 F.3d 328, 340 (2d Cir. 2000), aff’d on other grounds, 585 F.3d 559 
(2d Cir. 2009). 
 7 See id. at 270 (quoting INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 313 (2001)). 
 8 See id. 
 9 See infra Section VII. 
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whether claims are too factually tied to the underlying removal pro-
ceeding to continue in district court is a two-step process:  first it ex-
amines whether the claims involve actions that arise out of an order 
of removal; and second, it examines whether immigration courts can 
provide the requested remedy.  If the claims can be reviewed in im-
migration court, they “arise out” of circumstances involving an under-
lying order of removal and are therefore barred from review in dis-
trict court.  But if immigration courts cannot offer the requested 
remedy, these claims should not be barred from district court review. 
Section II gives a brief overview of the administrative process indi-
viduals undergo when immigration court proceedings have been in-
itiated.  Section III offers an introduction to the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act (INA), explaining Congress’s intent in enacting the 1996 
amendments to the INA, which limited the jurisdiction of federal dis-
trict courts hearing immigration-related claims.  Section IV then pro-
vides a brief introduction to Bivens claims and cases in which courts 
have found an award of money damages appropriate.  Then, Section 
V gives an explanation of the problems courts have had in interpret-
ing the INA and its effect on an immigration plaintiff’s access to fed-
eral courts.  Next, Section VI surveys cases applying § 1252(b)(9) 
generally, while Section VII offers an analysis of those cases that apply 
§ 1252(b)(9) to Bivens or other constitutional claims.  In Section VIII, 
the results of these cases are compared in order to create a map of 
the current jurisprudence regarding the jurisdictional bar of 
§ 1252(b)(9).  In Section IX, a solution to the tension exhibited in 
these cases is provided.  Finally, in Section X, the new analysis is ap-
plied to the existing case law as an illustration of the proposed solu-
tion in practice. 
II.  THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) creates the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (BIA) and places the administrative procedure 
for judicial review of cases flowing out of the BIA under the umbrella 
of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).10  However, courts have 
acknowledged that the APA “does not apply to the conduct of hear-
ings explicitly governed by the INA.”11  Therefore, the INA and APA, 
 
 10 Gerald L. Neuman, Jurisdiction and the Rule of Law after the 1996 Immigration Act, 113 HARV. 
L. REV. 1963, 1968 (2000) (explaining that the enactment of the INA “made the judicial 
review procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 (APA) applicable to cases 
arising under the INA” (internal citations omitted)). 
 11 Baez-Fernandez v. INS, 385 F. Supp. 2d 292, 295 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
1446 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 12:5 
 
when read together, produce a framework whereby non-citizens who 
enter the process of adjudicating immigration claims first seek relief 
through the administrative process within the immigration courts, 
and, after exhausting their claims in the administrative courts, appeal 
their final judgments to the courts of appeals. 
The first step for any non-citizen who is forcibly entered into the 
adjudication of immigration claims begins with the Executive Office 
for Immigration Review (EOIR).12  The EOIR “is responsible for ad-
judicating immigration cases” through “immigration court proceed-
ings, appellate reviews, and administrative hearings.”13  Most com-
monly, a non-citizen will appear before the EOIR in a removal 
hearing.14 
Removal proceeding begin when the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) charges a non-citizen with an immigration law viola-
tion by serving the non-citizen with a Notice to Appear (NTA) before 
an immigration judge.15  The non-citizen appears for an individual 
hearing in which the immigration judge considers the merits of the 
case and issues an oral decision.16 
Once the case is complete and the immigration judge issues a de-
cision, either party may choose to appeal the decision to the BIA.17  If 
both parties choose not to appeal, the immigration judge’s decision is 
considered administratively final.18  This final order can be executed 
unless appealed to a federal court that grants the non-citizen a stay, 
but “the alien’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies may lead 
the court to deny relief.”19  “Filing an appeal with the BIA from an 
immigration judge’s removal decision results in an automatic stay of 
the execution of the removal order.”20 
All BIA appeals “now go directly to a single BIA member who 
must decide . . . whether the case merits full appellate review or 
summary affirmance without an opinion.”21  If the case merits full re-
 
 12 Executive Office for Immigration Review, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Responsibilities, 
http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/responsibilities.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2010). 
13  Executive Office for Immigration Review, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Responsibilities, 
http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/responsibilities.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2010). 
 14 Office of the Chief Immigration Judge, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Immigration Court Practice 
Manual, http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/OCIJPracManual/ocij_page1.htm (last visited 
Mar. 19, 2010). 
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Ilana E. Greenstein, Board of Immigration Appeals and Federal Court Review of Deportation 
and Removal Decisions, in 2 IMMIGRATION PRACTICE MANUAL § 20.2.1 (2004). 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. § 20.3.2.  
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view, the BIA member refers the case to a three-member panel, which 
then conducts a full appellate review of the non-citizen’s case.22 
As an alternative to BIA proceedings, the non-citizen may also use 
a motion to reopen “when required by case law or regulation—or 
when new evidence exists to strengthen the [alien’s] case.”23  Howev-
er, once an appeal is filed, “an immigration judge no longer has ju-
risdiction over the proceedings, and any motion to reopen filed with 
the BIA is treated as a motion requesting remand.”24 
After a decision is issued by the BIA, which is final unless referred 
to the Attorney General for review, the non-citizen has the opportu-
nity to appeal once more in federal court.25  “The primary statutory 
basis for federal court review of an administratively final removal or-
der is 8 U.S.C. § 1252 . . . .”26  Once a case reaches the court of ap-
peals, the federal court “may consider only the administrative record 
on which the removal order is based, the pleadings, and the parties’ 
briefs” in adjudicating the appeal.27  “For other types of cases involv-
ing immigration issues” not related to removal proceedings, “the 
[APA] and the general grant of [federal question] jurisdic-
tion . . . still apply,” and such claims may be brought in federal dis-
trict court.28 
III.  A HISTORY OF THE INA 
Judicial intervention in immigration administrative decisions is a 
fairly recent phenomenon.  In fact, from 1882 to 1952, no statute au-
thorizing a judicial role existed.29  However, federal courts still infor-
mally exercised control in many cases, particularly in correcting im-
migration officials’ interpretations of the law in the habeas corpus 
context.30  However, the enactment of the INA (also referred to as the 
“Act”) in 1952 added to the judiciary’s traditionally held jurisdiction 
over habeas corpus review by requiring the adjudication of founda-
 
 22 Id.  
 23 Id. § 20.2.2. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id.  
 26 Id. § 20.3.1. 
 27 Daniel Kanstroom, Immigration Litigation in Federal Court, in 2 IMMIGRATION PRACTICE 
MANUAL § 20.5 (2004). 
 28 Id. § 20.5(E). 
 29 Neuman, supra note 10, at 1967.   
 30 Id.  Jurisdiction for such adjudications was primarily “founded on the general provi-
sion authorizing the grant of habeas corpus to persons in federal custody, the prede-
cessor of the current 28 U.S.C. § 2241.”  Id. 
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tional issues concerning the authority of executive officials to detail 
non-citizens for deportation or exclusion.31 
Since 1961, Congress amended the INA by placing “sole and ex-
clusive” power to review deportation decisions in the courts of ap-
peals.32  This was an attempt by Congress to cabin access to judicial 
review that the APA had created.33  The 1961 amendments allowed 
exclusion orders to be reviewed by writ of habeas corpus in the dis-
trict courts,34 but only allowed deportation orders to be reviewed in 
the courts of appeals under the Hobbs Act.35  However, “[t]he 1961 
Act contained no specific bars to judicial review for cases and issues 
properly exhausted administratively.”36  The INA was “subsequently 
amended in 1990, 1991, and 1994” to provide separate procedures 
for judicial review of deportation and exclusion orders.37 
In 1996, “two separate pieces of legislation significantly changed 
judicial review of immigration decisions.”38  The Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), passed on April 24, 1996, li-
mited judicial review “notably by eliminating it for most non-citizens 
 
 31 Id. at 1968.  “In 1955, the Supreme Court held that declaratory and injunctive relief 
under the . . . [APA] were available to test deportation orders under the INA.”  Hiro-
shi Motomura, Judicial Review in Immigration Cases After AADC:  Lessons from Civil Proce-
dure, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 385, 395 (2000) (citing Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 
48, 50–52 (1955)) (footnotes omitted).  In 1956, the Court extended this reasoning to 
exclusion orders as well.  Id. (citing Brownell v. Shung, 352 U.S. 180, 182–86 (1956)). 
 32 David M. McConnell, Judicial Review Under the Immigration and Nationality Act:  Habeas 
Corpus and the Coming of REAL ID (1996–2005), 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 75, 80–81 & n.30 
(2007) (“The fundamental purpose behind [placing exclusive review in the courts of 
appeals] . . . was to abbreviate the process of judicial review of deportation orders in 
order to frustrate certain practices which had come to the attention of Congress, 
whereby persons subject to deportation were forestalling departure by dilatory tactics 
in the courts.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Foti v. INS, 375 U.S. 217, 
224 (1963)); see Immigration and Nationality Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-301, § 5(a), 
75 Stat. 650, 651-52, repealed by Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsi-
bility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 306(b), 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-612. 
 33 Motomura, supra note 31, at 395. 
 34 See § 5(a), 75 Stat. at 651–53 (amending the INA to allow a final exclusion order to be 
judicially reviewed through habeas corpus proceedings). 
 35 Motomura, supra note 31, at 395 (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 2341–51 (1994)).  The Hobbs 
Act governs review for several administrative agencies.  Id. 
 36 McConnell, supra note 32, at 81. 
 37 Id.  See id. at 81 n. 32 (“Administrative proceedings governing the admission and removal 
of aliens from the United States have historically been termed ‘exclusion’ or ‘deporta-
tion’ proceedings . . . . With the enactment of the IIRIRA, Congress replaced these differ-
ing forms of proceedings with a single form called removal proceedings. . . . A removal 
order results from administrative proceedings conducted under new section 240 of the 
INA.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  See also Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 
101-694, 104 Stat. 4978 (1990); Miscellaneous and Technical Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Amendments of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-232, 105 Stat. 1733 (1991); Immigration and 
Naturalization Technical Corrections Act, Pub. L. No. 103-416 (1994). 
 38 Motomura, supra note 31, at 396. 
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deportable because of criminal convictions.”39  On September 30, 
1996, Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immi-
grant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), which repealed the judicial review 
scheme set forth in the INA of 1961 and replaced it with transitional 
and permanent rules to govern judicial review.40  While it continued 
the substantive limits the AEDPA placed upon judicial review of pro-
ceedings, the IIRIRA also restructured judicial review in “fundamen-
tal ways.”41  Under the IIRIRA, the permanent judicial review rules 
codified in § 242 of the INA apply to removal proceedings initiated 
on or after April 1, 1997.42  These rules serve to channel all judicial 
review of final orders of removal by the Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service (INS) to the courts of appeals.43  The IIRIRA, and § 242 
in particular, placed many limits on the role of the judiciary in immi-
gration cases.44  In particular, Congress enacted § 242(b)(9), which 
serves to consolidate questions for judicial review, both as a matter of 
time and forum.45 
IV.  AN INTRODUCTION TO BIVENS CLAIMS 
A.  Bivens and Its Progeny 
In the case of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau 
of Narcotics,46 the Supreme Court first authorized individuals to bring 
 
 39 Id. at 397; see also Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 
104-132, § 440(a), 110 Stat. 1214, 1276–77 (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 8, 18, 22, 28, 40, and 42 U.S.C.). 
 40 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-208, §§ 306(a), 306(b), 309(c)(4), 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-607 to -12, 3009-26 to -27 
(codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1231, 1252).  IIRIRA § 306(b) repealed INA § 106 and 
created the new INA § 242, which governs judicial review.  Id.  
 41 Motomura, supra note 31, at 397. 
 42 INA § 242, 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (Supp. III 1998); see also McConnell, supra note 32, at 84. 
 43 McConnell, supra note 32, at 84.  The Act therefore ensures that judicial review will occur 
“under the Hobbs Act procedure that had applied to deportation orders under former 
§ 106.”  Motomura, supra note 31, at 397 (citing INA § 242(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1) 
(Supp. III 1998)). 
“The issue was not whether or when judicial review was available, but rather in 
which court.  If a matter was included in a ‘final order,’ then § 106(a) applied, and 
judicial review was in the court of appeals.  If a matter was not included in a ‘final 
order,’ then review was in the district court under the general federal question sta-
tute . . . and former INA § 279.”   
 Motomura, supra note 31, at 415. 
 44 See INA § 242(a)(2)(B)–(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (a)(2)(B)–(C) (Supp. III 1998) (denying 
review to aliens deportable under crime-related grounds, and barring judicial review 
of integral categories of discretionary decisions and those that are specifically at the 
discretion of the Attorney General). 
 45 See id. § 1252(b)(9). 
 46 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
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claims for damages against federal officials for constitutional viola-
tions even without express statutory authorization.47  In this case, six 
agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics unlawfully entered the 
plaintiff’s apartment and conducted a warrantless search and arrest 
for narcotics violations.48  The Supreme Court held that the Fourth 
Amendment created a general right to file actions for damages in 
cases where federal officials violate constitutional or statutory legal 
rights.49  The Court concluded that the plaintiff could recover mone-
tary damages as long as there existed “no special factors counseling 
hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress” and “no 
explicit congressional declarations[s] that persons injured by a feder-
al officer’s violation of the Fourth Amendment may not recover 
money damages from the agents, but must instead be remitted to 
another remedy, equally effective in the view of Congress.”50 
The Court quickly signaled to the lower courts and potential 
plaintiffs that Bivens could be applied to other constitutional viola-
tions soon afterward, when it extended the right to damages to Fifth 
and Eighth Amendment violations.51  However, since Carlson v. 
Green,52 the Court has denied Bivens remedies to constitutional viola-
tions in a number of cases, focusing mainly on the two exceptions ar-
ticulated in Bivens.53 
 
 47 Christopher G. Froelich, Closing the Equitable Loophole:  Assessing the Supreme Court’s Next 
Move Regarding the Availability of Equitable Relief for Military Plaintiffs, 35 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 699, 714 (2005). 
 48 Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389. 
 49 Id. at 392. 
 50 Id. at 396–97.  The Court noted several such factors “counseling hesitation,” which 
include questions of federal fiscal policy and the imposition of “liability upon a con-
gressional employee for actions contrary to no constitutional prohibition.”  Id.  Since 
Bivens, the Court has considered a number of cases in which it has denied Bivens re-
medies to constitutional violations. 
 51 See, e.g., Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18–23 (1980) (extending Bivens to situations 
where there is no statute conferring the constitutional rights being violated and al-
ternate remedies exist); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 245 (1979) (holding that 
damages are appropriate for violations of the Fifth Amendment because (1) it is a 
remedial scheme normally available in federal courts, (2) it would be judicially mana-
geable without difficult questions about valuation or causation, and (3) there are no 
alternative forms of relief).   
 52 446 U.S. at 14. 
 53 See, e.g., Correctional Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 74 (2001) (retreating from 
requiring adequate remedies by barring damages where other remedies, even when 
they are not federal or fully corrective in nature, are available); Schweiker v. Chilicky, 
487 U.S. 412, 424–29 (1988) (holding that administrative schemes that award restitu-
tion but not expected damages function as a factor counseling hesitation of federal 
court intervention); Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 300 (1983) (holding that spe-
cial factors counseling hesitation exist in situations where enlisted military personnel 
claim constitutional violations by superior officers); Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 388–
90 (1983) (holding that since the government’s comprehensive, remedial scheme 
protecting civil servants against arbitrary action by supervisors provides remedies for 
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B.  The Intersection of Bivens Claims and the INA 
A key question arises in the area of Bivens claims flowing out of 
the immigration context.  Congress, in enacting the Immigration and 
Nationality Act, created a comprehensive scheme, including adjudi-
cation, to assist in the regulation of immigration.54  Does the statutory 
scheme of the INA preclude federal courts from adjudicating Bivens 
claims arising out of the immigration context?  Or is the INA scheme 
for judicial review insufficient for providing relief for some Bivens 
claims?  Federal courts have grappled with these questions and have 
come to varying results, allowing some Bivens claims to be brought in 
federal district court, while dismissing others. 
V.  AN EXPLANATION OF THE PROBLEM 
Two key questions arise out of the IIRIRA with regard to judicial 
review:  (1) at what point does a federal court have jurisdiction to re-
view an immigration-related decision by a government agency; and 
(2) in which court can a petitioner bring his or her claim?  The an-
swer to both of these questions hinges on the federal courts’ under-
standing of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9). 
Section 1252(b)(9) establishes exclusive appellate jurisdiction 
over claims “arising from any action taken or proceeding brought to 
remove an alien.”55  The Supreme Court has described this provision 
as a “general jurisdictional limitation” and an “unmistakable ‘zipper’ 
clause,”56 which channels all questions of law and fact arising from 
removal proceedings to the federal courts of appeals.57  Because it en-
compasses “‘all questions of law and fact’ and extends to both ‘consti-
tutional and statutory’ challenges,” its expanse has been described by 
one court of appeals as “breathtaking.”58 
 
these employees, a new judicial remedy for the same constitutional violations was not 
necessary). 
 54 See supra Section II. 
 55 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9).   
 56 Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 482–83 (1999). 
 57 Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 270 (E.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d on other grounds, 585 
F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 58 Aguilar v. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 510 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2007) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  “As its text makes manifest, that proviso was de-
signed to consolidate and channel review of all legal and factual questions that arise 
from the removal of an alien into the administrative process, with judicial review of 
those decisions vested exclusively in the courts of appeals.”  Id.  Therefore, a petition-
er cannot avoid the jurisdictional channel by aggregating claims associated with re-
moval, each one of which would be jurisdictionally barred if brought alone.  Id. at 9–
10. 
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However, courts are careful to ensure that this jurisdiction-
limiting provision of the IIRIRA does not divest district courts entirely 
of jurisdiction to hear challenges to removal.59  As the Supreme Court 
explained in INS v. St. Cyr, § 1252(b)(9) is intended “to consolidate 
judicial review of immigration proceedings into one action in the 
court of appeals, not to eliminate judicial review altogether.”60  Con-
gress enacted § 1252(b)(9) in response to “the problem of successive 
filings and additional back-door challenges to removal orders,” a 
problem created by holdings that allowed parties to initiate separate 
proceedings for a challenge to the denial of a stay of deportation in 
federal district court and a challenge to the underlying deportation 
order itself in immigration court.61  By consolidating review into one 
forum, Congress attempted to channel all removal-related challenges 
into one process.62 
Courts have, however, been careful to ensure that § 1252(b)(9)’s 
scope is not limitless.63  They have not read the statute’s “arising 
from” limitation to “swallow all claims” that tangentially “touch upon, 
or [can] be traced to, the government’s efforts to remove an alien.”64  
If Congress had intended for the statute to reach so broadly, it could 
have used broader language.65  Since it neglected to do so, Congress’ 
choice of phrase has been taken by courts to suggest that Congress 
did not intend § 1252(b)(9) to take “into its scope claims with only a 
remote or attenuated connection to the removal of an alien,”66 or 
“claims that are independent of, or wholly collateral to, the removal 
process.”67 
 
 59 Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 269. 
 60 INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 313 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted), quoted in 
Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 270. 
 61 Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 269–70 (citing Calcano-Martinez v. INS, 232 F.3d 328, 340 (2d 
Cir. 2000)); see also Aguilar, 510 F.3d at 9 (“In enacting section 1252(b)(9), Congress 
plainly intended to put an end to the scattershot and piecemeal nature of the review 
process that previously had held sway in regard to removal proceedings.”); Flores-
Miramontes v. INS, 212 F.3d 1133, 1140–41 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that before the 
enactment of § 1252(b)(9), motions to reopen were to be brought in the courts of 
appeals whereas challenges to denials of stays of deportation could be brought in fed-
eral district courts under the general federal question statute). 
 62 See Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 269–70. 
 63 Aguilar, 510 F.3d at 10. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Motomura, supra note 31, at 424; see also Humphries v. Various Fed. Usins Employees, 
164 F.3d 936, 943 (1999) (holding that if Congress had intended for the provisions of 
the INA to be read more expansively, it could have used the term “related to,” which 
would have relaxed the requirements under which claims could be barred). 
 66 Aguilar, 510 F.3d at 10. 
 67 Id. at 11; see also H.R. REP. No. 109-72, at 175 (2005) (Conf. Rep.) (“Moreover, section 
106 would not preclude habeas review over challenges to detention that are indepen-
dent of challenges to removal orders.  Instead, the bill would eliminate habeas review 
only over challenges to removal orders.”). 
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Federal courts have thus determined what Congress did not in-
tend the term “arise from” to mean.  However, courts have had a 
more difficult time assessing which claims “arise from” the underlying 
removal proceeding, and which claims are merely collateral to such 
proceedings.  This inquiry has been particularly problematic in the 
adjudication of Bivens or other similar constitutional claims. 
Bivens claims may arise in the immigration context “when the gov-
ernment physically and forcibly apprehends noncitizens as part of the 
process of removing them from the United States.”68  May plaintiffs in 
these cases bring their Bivens claims to federal district court before a 
final order of removal has been issued in the immigration courts?69  
The answer to this question has important consequences for the non-
citizen attempting to make this challenge in court. 
Forcing plaintiffs to wait to receive a final order of removal before 
bringing their Bivens claims to court may require them to endure a 
long wait, even though their constitutional claims may be at the core 
of their case.70  If plaintiffs wished to expedite the court’s hearing of 
their constitutional claims, they would be forced to rush the hearing 
of their administrative claims, often resulting in an unfavorable con-
clusion, and then to let the time to appeal run.71 
Even if such plaintiffs took the chance of an unfavorable removal 
order so they could expedite their constitutional case, they may be 
further handicapped by the fact that the federal courts of appeals are 
not fact-finding bodies.  Courts of appeals rely on the records created 
in the lower administrative body, including the proceedings in front 
of the immigration judge and BIA, to review claims.  If plaintiffs are 
unable to establish the record necessary to argue their constitutional 
case in a court of appeals, they are unlikely to prevail in this federal 
court.72  Therefore, it is imperative that the delineation of federal 
court jurisdiction in these types of cases is both clear and fair. 
 
 68 Motomura, supra note 31, at 431; see, e.g., Lynch v. Cannatella, 810 F.2d 1363, 1366 
(5th Cir. 1987) (“[D]etained and allegedly mistreated before being deported . . . . We 
hold that even excludable aliens are entitled to the protection of the due process 
clause [sic] while they are physically in the United States.”). 
 69 In his 2000 article, Professor Motomura argues persuasively that § 1252(b)(9)’s juris-
dictional limitation barring claims arising from a removal proceeding from being 
brought in federal district court does not apply to Federal Tort Claims Act or Bivens 
claims.  Motomura, supra note 31, at 431.  However, federal district and circuit courts 
have not read the statute as narrowly as Professor Motomura prescribes and have ad-
judicated such claims on a case-by-case basis, creating tensions between various 
courts’ holdings on the viability of plaintiffs’ Bivens claims in federal district courts. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. at 388. 
 72 See Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. (AADC), 525 U.S. 471, 476 (1999) 
(“Since neither the Immigration Judge nor the Board of Immigration Appeals has au-
thority to hear such claims . . . a challenge to a final order of deportation based upon 
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Since the enactment of the IIRIRA, federal district courts and 
courts of appeals have struggled to apply § 1252(b)(9) to claims of 
constitutional violations and have failed to produce a coherent ana-
lytical method.  The next Section describes the jurisprudence of 
§ 1252(b)(9). 
VI.  APPLYING § 1252(b)(9) 
A.  A Tale of Beginnings:  Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination 
Committee 
In 1999, the Supreme Court first dealt with § 1252 in Reno v. Amer-
ican-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (AADC).73  The respondents, 
non-citizens affiliated with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Pa-
lestine, sued the federal government for targeting them for deporta-
tion because of their membership in a politically unpopular group.74  
While their suit was pending, Congress passed the IIRIRA.75  The gov-
ernment argued that the IIRIRA barred district court review of chal-
lenges to the deportation proceedings prior to the entry of a final or-
der of deportation.76  The Court, relying solely on § 1252(g), found 
that Congress had deprived federal courts of jurisdiction to review 
the Attorney General’s discrete decisions to “commence proceedings, 
adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien under 
this Act.”77 
For the purposes of analyzing the Court’s jurisprudence on 
§ 1252(b)(9), AADC is instructive in what it does not explicitly hold.  
Its exclusive focus on § 1252(g) left unresolved the larger question of 
whether § 1252(b)(9) is likewise made unavailable, absent a final re-
moval order, ordinary judicial review in cases presenting constitu-
tional issues but not strictly limited to removal proceedings (for ex-
ample, habeas corpus petitions).78 
 
such a claim would arrive in the court of appeals without the factual development ne-
cessary for decision.”). 
 73 Id. at 471. 
 74 Id. at 473–74. 
 75 Id. at 475. 
 76 Id. 
 77 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g), cited in AADC, 525 U.S. at 482. 
 78 AADC, 525 U.S. at 489 n.10. 
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B.  The First Foray into § 1252(b)(9):  INS v. St. Cyr 
Two years later, the Court applied its holdings in AADC to INS v. 
St. Cyr.79  Though this case dealt primarily with respondent St. Cyr’s 
habeas corpus application, it provides illuminating clues about the 
Court’s initial treatment of the jurisdiction-limiting provisions of 
§ 1252(b)(9) in the aftermath of AADC. 
In St. Cyr, the respondent, a lawful, permanent United States resi-
dent, pleaded guilty to a criminal charge of selling a controlled sub-
stance in violation of state law, making him deportable.80  St. Cyr’s 
removal proceedings had commenced after AEDPA and IIRIRA had 
become effective.81  Among its many arguments, the INS claimed that 
the federal district court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over 
St. Cyr’s habeas petition because § 1252 consolidated all questions for 
judicial review to federal courts of appeals.82 
The Supreme Court noted that, though the purpose of 
§ 1252(b)(9) was to consolidate judicial review of immigration pro-
ceedings in the courts of appeals, this provision did not bar habeas 
jurisdiction over any removal orders not subject to judicial review un-
der § 1252(a)(1).83  This included orders against non-citizens made 
removable for having committed criminal offenses.84  Furthermore, 
the Court noted that the 1961 amendments channeled review of final 
orders to courts of appeals but unequivocally permitted district courts 
to continue to exercise jurisdiction over claims that fell outside a “fi-
nal order.”85 
Finally, the Court addressed the issue of alternative forums for re-
lief.  In particular, it noted that if it were possible for the question of 
law St. Cyr raised to be answered in another judicial forum, it may 
have been more inclined to accept the Government’s reading of 
§ 1252 as barring such claims for relief.86  However, since St. Cyr 
lacked an alternative forum for his claim, the Court held that habeas 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2242 was not repealed by the jurisdic-
tion-limiting provisions of the AEDPA and IIRIRA.87 
 
 79 533 U.S. 289 (2001). 
 80 Id. at 293. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. at 309–12. 
 83 Id. at 313. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. at 313 n.37 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-
Discrim. Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 485 (1999)). 
 86 Id. at 314. 
 87 Id. 
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While St. Cyr was the first case in which the Supreme Court 
tackled issues raised by § 1252(b)(9), the Court narrowly tied its anal-
ysis to the viability of a plaintiff’s habeas petition and did not reach 
the issue of § 1252(b)(9)’s effects on other constitutional claims. 
C.  Understanding the Issue of “Finality” for the Purposes of § 1252(b)(9) 
Since the Court in St. Cyr specifically confined § 1252 to operating 
only on final orders of removal, courts of appeals have also been con-
fronted with determining when an order becomes “final.”  In answer-
ing this question, they have had to explore the issue of exhaustion 
and have determined that an order becomes final when the immigra-
tion judge issues an order which the BIA then affirms, or the time to 
appeal expires.88  Since AADC and St. Cyr, courts continue to deal with 
the multitude of claims that may arise out of removal proceedings, 
including the issue of finality, claims against illegal deportation,89 and 
ineffective assistance of counsel,90 and they have done so with little 
guidance.  An area in which courts have had particular difficulty in 
determining whether the jurisdictional provisions of § 1252 apply is 
in the realm of Bivens actions arising from facts or circumstances sur-
rounding a plaintiff’s removal.  The following section surveys existing 
case law in which plaintiffs’ primary claims do not concern their re-
moval, but constitutional claims.  As will become evident, courts have 
not approached this class of cases using a uniform rubric, but have 
instead created distinctions between types of constitutional claims 
that are barred under varying rationales. 
 
 88 See Halabi v. Ashcroft, 316 F.3d 807, 808 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding that federal courts 
do not have jurisdiction for claims where plaintiffs fail to exhaust their remedies in 
immigration court (citing Montero-Martinez v. Ashcroft, 277 F.3d 1137, 1140–41 & 
n.2 (9th Cir. 2002))); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1)(B)(i) (“[N]o court shall have ju-
risdiction to review any judgment regarding the granting of relief under sec-
tion . . . 1229b . . . of this title . . . .”). 
 89 See, e.g., Kumarasamy v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 453 F.3d 169, 172 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding 
that Kumarasamy’s claim that his deportation was illegal because there was no order 
of removal was entirely separate from any claim for judicial review of an order of re-
moval, and was therefore not barred by § 1252(b)(9)). 
 90 See, e.g., Afanwi v. Mukasey, 526 F.3d 788, 795–96 (4th Cir. 2008) (holding that al-
though the court did not have jurisdiction over Afanwi’s claim of ineffective assistance 
of counsel, § 1252(b)(9) did not create a jurisdictional bar to allowing federal courts 
to consider this issue); Singh v. Gonzales, 499 F.3d 969, 972 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding 
that a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with post-administrative 
filings with the court of appeals falls outside the jurisdiction-limiting provisions of the 
REAL ID Act). 
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VII.  APPLYING § 1252(b)(9) IN THE BIVENS  CONTEXT 
Courts applying § 1252(b)(9) to Bivens claims over the last ten 
years have been unable to articulate any “simple, one-size-fits-all”91 an-
swers, though they have valiantly tried to analyze the issues with vary-
ing degrees of success.  This section will provide an overview of cases, 
in order of their depth of § 1252(b)(9) analysis.  The First Circuit in 
Aguilar v. Immigration and Customs Enforcement and the Eastern District 
of New York in Arar v. Ashcroft provide two examples of the more ri-
gorous and detailed treatments the federal courts have offered. 
A.  Aguilar v. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
In Aguilar, federal officers conducted a raid targeting more than 
300 rank-and-file employees of a Department of Defense contractor 
for civil immigration infractions.92  Immigrations and Customs En-
forcement (ICE) then transferred a significant proportion of these 
detainees to detention and removal operation centers that were a 
considerable distance away.93  The employee-detainees alleged that 
they:  (1) were subject to arbitrary, prolonged, and indefinite deten-
tion; (2) were denied a prompt bond hearing prior to any transfer; 
(3) were denied access to counsel; and (4) suffered from loss of fami-
ly integrity.94 
The First Circuit began its analysis with an exercise in statutory 
construction.95  Noting Congress’s goal in consolidating and channe-
ling questions arising from the removal process, the First Circuit held 
that the words “arising from” in § 1252(b)(9) should be read to ex-
clude those claims that are “independent of, or wholly collateral to, 
the removal process.”96  Therefore, the court found that § 1252(b)(9) 
 
 91 Aguilar v. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 510 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2007).  
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. at 7. 
 95 Id. at 8. 
 96 Id. at 11.  The First Circuit drew upon the long-recognized exception to the exhaus-
tion requirement for claims that are collateral to administrative proceedings.  Id. at 
12; see also Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 212–13 (1994) (stating 
courts have previously deemed claims collateral when requiring exhaustion would fo-
reclose all meaningful judicial review).  “[C]ourts have demonstrated a particular 
hostility toward requiring exhaustion when adequate relief could not feasibly be ob-
tained through the prescribed administrative proceedings.”  Aguilar, 510 F.3d at 12 
(citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 331 (1976)).  This is particularly true when 
a party would be irreparably harmed by adherence to an exhaustion requirement.  
Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 483 (1986). 
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carried an inherent exception for claims that are independent from 
removal orders that could be applied to the Bivens context.97 
The court found such an exception important because requiring 
the exhaustion of constitutional claims in administrative proceedings 
would “foreclose them from any meaningful judicial review.”98  Since 
Congress’s intention was “to channel, rather than bar, judicial re-
view,” the First Circuit held that courts must not read “arising from” 
as used in § 1252(b)(9) to encompass those claims99 that cannot be 
raised efficaciously within the administrative proceedings of the 
INA.100  The court found that such claims could not, by definition, be 
ones that arise from an alien’s removal.101 
Having established these foundational precepts, the First Circuit 
went on to examine whether § 1252(b)(9) required the petitioners to 
exhaust their specific claims in the administrative framework.102  The 
court first examined petitioners’ conditions-of-confinement claims 
and dismissed them on procedural grounds because these claims 
were not raised in the lower court pleadings.103  However, it is unclear 
whether the court would have found these claims barred by 
§ 1252(b)(9) had they been raised on procedurally solid grounds.104 
The court reached the contrary conclusion with respect to peti-
tioners’ right-to-counsel claims.  Such claims, the Court held, were so 
intertwined with the removal process that allowing aliens to bring 
them directly to district court would result in the fragmented litiga-
tion Congress sought to avoid in enacting the INA amendments.105  
Moreover, the court acknowledged that petitioners could raise and 
seek redress for these claims before an immigration judge and the 
BIA before coming to the court of appeals.106  Hence, the right-to-
counsel claims “arise from” and are part-and-parcel of the removal 
proceeding,107 and they are barred by § 1252(b)(9) from district court 
review. 
Finally, the court considered petitioners’ due process claims “al-
leg[ing] violation[] of the Fifth Amendment right of parents to make 
 
 97 Aguilar, 510 F.3d at 11; see also Sissoko v. Rocha, 440 F.3d 1145, 1156–57 n.18 (9th Cir. 
2006) (finding that the jurisdiction-stripping provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) do not 
foreclose a non-citizen’s claims for money damages under Bivens). 
 98 Aguilar, 510 F.3d at 11. 
 99 Id. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. at 12. 
103 Id. at 13. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. at 13–14. 
106 Id. at 14. 
107 Id. at 13. 
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decisions as to the care, custody, and control of their children.”108  
Though these claims are somewhat connected to removal, the court 
found that:  (1) the right to family integrity is only marginally related 
to removal; (2) the harm from continuing disruption may be irrepar-
able; and (3) the issue is not one which the immigration court would 
ordinarily adjudicate.109  Furthermore, since the issue of family integr-
ity is generally “completely irrelevant” to the variety of issues that are 
likely to be litigated in removal proceedings, and the claims typically 
have no bearing on the aliens’ immigration status, § 1252(b)(9) does 
not bar such claims.110  The court also noted that the fact that peti-
tioners have no other means by which to assert this right further ar-
gued in favor of jurisdiction.111 
B.  Arar v. Ashcroft 
In a 2009 en banc opinion, the Second Circuit in Arar v. Ashcroft 
adjudicated another set of constitutional claims arising from removal 
proceedings.112  However, this court, unlike the First Circuit in Agui-
lar, did not reach the question of whether the INA deprived the dis-
trict court of subject-matter jurisdiction over Arar’s removal-related 
Bivens claims.113  Instead, it dismissed those claims as beyond the 
reach of Bivens, without addressing the “vexed question” of law aris-
ing from an analysis of the applicability of the INA’s jurisdiction-
stripping provisions.114  Though the Second Circuit opted to avoid 
deciding whether the district court had subject-matter jurisdiction 
over Arar’s removal-related Bivens claims, the district court’s treat-
ment of the issue provides useful insight into the manner in which 
courts currently analyze the jurisdictional bar. 
Plaintiff Arar was a “native of Syria who immigrated to Canada 
with his family.”115  While in transit at JFK airport in New York, he was 
identified as the member of a known terrorist organization and was 
interrogated by officials, held in solitary confinement, and denied re-
peated requests to speak to his lawyer.116  Arar was later given an op-
 
108 Id. at 18–19. 
109 Id. at 19. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. 
112 Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009) (upholding district court and panel deci-
sions dismissing defendant’s contention that mistreatment suffered while in U.S. cus-
tody provided a basis for a claim under the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause), 
aff’g on other grounds, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 252 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). 
113 Id. at 571. 
114 Id. 
115 Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 252. 
116 Id. at 253. 
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portunity to return to Syria but refused, citing a fear of being tor-
tured.117 
The INS initiated removal proceedings, subsequently determined 
Arar was clearly part of al Qaeda and was therefore inadmissible to 
the United States, and ordered him to be sent to Syria.118  When Arar 
was handed over to the Syrians, United States officials had not in-
formed the Canadian consulate of his removal.119  A Final Notice of 
Inadmissibility ordered Arar removed without further inquiry before 
an immigration judge.120 
Arar raised four claims for relief in the district court, two of which 
are relevant to the study of § 1252(b)(9):  (1) that defendants vi-
olated his rights under the Fifth Amendment by knowingly subjecting 
him to torture in Syria; and (2) that he was denied access to counsel, 
the courts, and the consulate in violation of his Fifth Amendment 
rights.121 
Reviewing the jurisdictional limitations imposed by the INA, the 
court noted that the amendments to the INA were designed “to 
create a streamlined procedure allowing for the effective administra-
tion of the immigration laws so that the removal of illegal aliens can 
proceed with as much alacrity as possible while maintaining a mini-
mum of procedural due process.”122  Therefore, it held that the un-
derlying question to be decided was whether Arar’s claims, at the 
core, challenged his removal.123 
The district court disagreed with the government’s attempts to re-
define Arar’s action as “a simple challenge to circumstances ‘arising 
out of’” Arar’s removal.124  The court noted that Arar’s claims did not 
concern why the government chose to send Arar to Syria or attack the 
bases of sending him there.125  Instead, Arar’s claims concerned the 
legality of sending him to a country where they knew he would be tor-
tured and arbitrarily detained.126  Therefore, the district court found 
that Arar’s allegations are separate from, and collateral to, the under-
lying removal order under which he was deported.127 
 
117 Id. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. at 254. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. at 257–58. 
122 Id. at 268. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. at 268–70. 
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Arar’s situation was unusual, if not unique, because he did not 
have the opportunity to challenge his removal at a hearing at all.128  In 
this case, Arar alleged that federal officials obstructed him from filing 
his claim that he was denied access to counsel.129  The court noted 
that this deprivation did not leave Arar in a position similar to other 
deportees, who could wait to conclude their administrative proceed-
ings before seeking review in a court of appeals.130 
Since Arar’s claims did not challenge his deportation, but rather 
the legality of deportation to Syria where he would likely be tortured 
and because the administrative procedure would not remedy his lack 
of counsel claim.  The district court found that his claims were sepa-
rate from and collateral to his removal and not barred by 
§ 1252(b)(9).131 
C.  Turkmen v. Ashcroft 
In 2006, the Eastern District of New York also determined whether 
right-to-counsel claims were subject to the jurisdictional bars of 
§ 1252(b)(9).132  In Turkmen v. Ashcroft, the plaintiffs were arrested 
and detained on immigration violations following the 9/11 attacks.133  
During the time of their detention, plaintiffs asserted that they were 
not issued their Notices to Appear (NTAs) in a timely fashion, they 
were denied bond on the basis of religion and ethnicity without as-
sessing flight risk, they were subjected to a communications blackout 
that interfered with their access to counsel, and they were detained 
for longer than was necessary after receiving their final orders of re-
moval.134 
 
128 Id. at 269. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. (citing Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 479 (1999)).   
131 Though the court held that Arar’s claims were not barred by § 1252(b)(9), it still found it 
did not have proper jurisdiction to entertain his Bivens claims because of overriding fac-
tors counseling hesitation.  Id. at 283.  Since the district court felt that the task for balanc-
ing individual rights against such serious national security concerns was not one courts 
should undertake, it directed the Legislative and Executive branches to design a suitable 
remedy or enact explicit legislation directing judges to do so.  Id. 
132 Turkmen v. Ashcroft, No. 02 CV 2307, 2006 WL 1662663, at *25 (E.D.N.Y. June 14, 
2006), rev’d on alternate grounds, 589 F.3d 542 (2d Cir. 2009).  The Second Circuit af-
firmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the district court, but on grounds 
separate from the jurisdictional bar of § 1252(b)(9).  Turkmen, 589 F.3d at 542.  Since 
the Second Circuit’s opinion does not concern the jurisdictional bar at issue here, the 
district court’s decision remains instructive on this issue in this case. 
133 Turkmen, 2006 WL 1662663, at *1. 
134 Id. at *2. 
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The district court found that plaintiffs’ challenges to the denial of 
bond were barred by § 1252(b)(9).135  It first noted that the regula-
tions governing the jurisdiction of the BIA specifically provide that 
“the Board may review appeals from [d]eterminations relating to 
bond.”136  That these challenges could have been reviewed by the BIA 
was instrumental in the court’s finding that the plaintiffs could not 
bring them to district court.137 
Moreover, the court also found that the denial of bond was not an 
issue separate and apart from the underlying removal proceeding, 
but instead served to assure the plaintiffs’ presence at later stages of 
the removal proceedings.138  The court found this to be exactly the 
kind of claim Congress had in mind when it enacted § 1252(b)(9) to 
bar judicial review by the district court.139 
Plaintiffs also alleged that the communications blackout violated 
their rights to due process under the Fifth Amendment, including 
access to legal counsel.140  The court acknowledged an alien’s right to 
counsel in a proceeding before an immigration judge, but noted that 
a claim to this right could properly be presented to the BIA and then 
to the court of appeals.141 
The court then turned to the question of whether the communi-
cations blackout arose out of a removal proceeding and was thus 
barred by § 1252(b)(9).  It found that the phrase “action taken . . . to 
remove an alien” implied any action taken for the purpose of remov-
ing an alien, and it held that the purpose of the communications 
blackout was not to remove the plaintiffs, but instead to reduce the 
risk of further terrorist attacks.142  Therefore, the court found that the 
plaintiffs’ communications blackout claim was not barred by 
§ 1252(b)(9).143 
Similarly, plaintiffs’ challenges to the Attorney General’s delay in 
serving them with NTAs after detaining them were not barred by 
§ 1252(b)(9).144  In the sequence of events in immigration proceed-
ings, the court noted that the service of the NTA marks the begin-
ning of the process by which action is taken or proceedings are 
 
135 Id. at * 25. 
136 Id. at *25 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 8 
C.F.R. § 1003.1(b)(7)). 
137 Id. at *25. 
138 Id. at *26 n.28. 
139 Id. at *26. 
140 Id. 
141 Id. 
142 Id. (omission in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
143 Id. 
144 Id. 
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brought against an alien and the purpose of detention is declared.145  
Therefore, the court found that a failure to bring proceedings is not 
within the scope of § 1252(b)(9), and plaintiffs’ claims challenging 
the delay in serving them with NTAs should properly be heard in dis-
trict court.146 
Finally, the court addressed plaintiffs’ length-of-detention 
claims.147  In its discussion of the implications of § 1252(b)(9), the 
court stated that, since challenges to the length of detention are not 
actions subject to review under § 1252(a)(1), § 1252(b)(9) does not 
apply.148 
D.  Turnbull v. United States 
A year later, in 2007, the district court in the Northern District of 
Ohio was asked to adjudicate a case in which the result turned on 
what constitutes an “order of removal,” as described by § 1252(a)(1), 
that might make the § 1252(b)(9) jurisdictional bar applicable.149  In 
Turnbull v. United States,150 the plaintiff was a native and citizen of Ja-
maica who had served time for drug trafficking convictions.151  
“[P]rior to his release from prison on his second conviction, the Im-
migration and Naturalization Service (INS) commenced deportation 
proceedings against [him].”152  After he exhausted his administrative 
appeals, the INS served a Warrant of Deportation.153  Just before he 
was deported, he contacted his attorney, who then sought and was 
granted a stay in the district court.154  However, though they were 
aware of the stay, ICE officers neglected to remove Turnbull from the 
plane.155  The district court subsequently entered an order directing 
the United States “to immediately retrieve Turnbull from Jamaica.”156  
Turnbull was returned to the United States thirty-two days after he 
 
145 Id. 
146 Id. 
147 Id. at *27. 
148 Id. at *27 n.30. 
149 Turnbull v. United States, No. 1:06cv858, 2007 WL 2153279, at *5 (N.D. Ohio July 23, 
2007). 
150 Id. 
151 Id. at *1. 
152 Id. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. at *2 (“Before getting on the plane, plaintiff was allowed to place a telephone call 
to his mother, and she in turn contacted plaintiff’s counsel.” (internal citation omit-
ted)). 
155 Id. 
156 Id. 
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had been deported.  He filed suit, seeking damages against certain 
individual federal agents under Bivens.157 
The court rejected the government’s argument that § 1252(b)(9) 
bars jurisdiction for reasons similar to those expressed by the Turkmen 
court.158  Primarily, the court noted that Turnbull’s claim was not a 
back-door attempt “to circumvent the administrative process set up to 
review orders of removal.”159  Rather, his suit was “specifically limited 
to an attack upon the decision to disregard the Magistrate Judge’s 
stay order.”160  The claim did not implicate an order of removal under 
§ 1252(a)(1), but instead was based upon the actions of several fed-
eral officers after a stay to such an order was entered.161  Therefore, 
the court found that § 1252(b)(9) did not bar Turnbull’s claims from 
being brought in district court.162 
E.  Khorrami v. Rolince 
In the same year as Turbull, Khorrami v. Rolince was decided.  The 
plaintiff, Dr. Khorrami, was an Iranian-born British citizen residing in 
the United States.163  In the days following September 11, 2001, Dr. 
Khorrami was interrogated by the FBI with the use of threatening and 
abusive language and was denied permission to contact the British 
embassy and his family.164  The immigration judge issued a final order 
finding Dr. Khorrami to be removable.165  However, the judge also 
granted Dr. Khorrami’s request for permanent residence status based 
on his marriage to a United States citizen.166  As a result, though he 
was deemed removable, Dr. Khorrami was not deported.167  Dr. Khor-
rami filed suit for Bivens violations arising from allegedly prolonged 
and abusive interrogation and denials of access to counsel.168 
In this case, the court did not analyze whether the claims were in-
tertwined with the removal process.  Instead, the court decided the 
 
157 Id. 
158 Id. at *6; see also supra Section VII.C. 
159 Turnbull, 2007 WL 2153279 at *6. 
160 Id. 
161 Id. at *5. 
162 Id. at *6. 
163 493 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1064 (N.D. Ill. 2007), aff’d on other grounds 539 F.3d 782 (7th 
Cir. 2008).  The government appealed the district court’s decision in Khorrami v. Ro-
lince on the issue of qualified immunity, and the Seventh Circuit did not address the 
question of § 1252(b)(9) jurisdiction.  Khorrami, 539 F.3d at 782.  Therefore, for pur-
poses of the jurisdictional bar, the district court opinion controls. 
164 Khorrami, 493 F. Supp. 2d at 1064.   
165 Id. at 1065. 
166 Id. at 1065–66. 
167 Id. at 1066. 
168 See id. at 1061. 
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applicability of § 1252(b)(9) by focusing primarily on the fact that “it 
only applies with respect to review of an order of removal.”169  It 
found that though he was deemed removable, Dr. Khorrami’s grant 
of permanent residency functioned as an adjustment of status, not a 
removal order.170  The fact that a formal removal order was not appli-
cable takes it out of the realm of the applicability of § 1252(b)(9).171  
Since a final removal order was not issued, § 1252(b)(9) provides no 
bar to bringing removal-related claims in district court.172 
F.  The Outlier:  Arias v. United States Immigrations and Customs 
Enforcement 
In a move that diverged from the majority of federal court cases 
that had reviewed the applicability of the § 1252(b)(9) jurisdictional 
bar to Bivens actions, the district court for the District of Minnesota in 
2008 held categorically that all Bivens claims arising out of circums-
tances surrounding immigration proceedings were barred from plea 
in federal district court by § 1252(b)(9).173  In Arias v. United States 
Immigrations and Customs Enforcement, ICE agents implemented a civil 
immigration enforcement operation by forcibly entering homes ille-
gally and conducting warrantless, non-consensual searches of the 
plaintiffs who were thought to have remained in the United States.174  
They subsequently arrested the plaintiffs.175  Plaintiffs filed suit in fed-
eral district court under Bivens, alleging that the ICE agents had vi-
olated their Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights.176 
Relying on the First Circuit’s analysis in Aguilar, the district court 
held that the plaintiffs’ Fourth and Fifth Amendment claims were 
“common in removal proceedings and could directly im-
pact . . . [their] immigration status.”177  The court further noted that 
“allowing aliens to ignore the channeling provisions of § 1252(b)(9) 
and bring [these] claims directly in the district court” would frag-
ment the removal process and interfere with the efficient administra-
 
169 Id. at 1066–1067. 
170 Id. at 1067. 
171 Id. 
172 Id. 
173 See Arias v. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, No. 07-1959, 2008 WL 
1827604 (D. Minn. Apr. 23, 2008). 
174 Id. at *3. 
175 Id. 
176 Id. at *4. 
177 Id. at *6. 
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tion of immigration laws.178  Therefore, the court held it lacked sub-
ject-matter jurisdiction to consider these Bivens claims.179 
VIII.  LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE CASES:  PUTTING TOGETHER 
§ 1252(b)(9) AND BIVENS 
Since St. Cyr, several federal district and circuit courts have at-
tempted to analyze the applicability of the § 1252(b)(9) bar to vari-
ous Bivens claims but, as the previous section shows, they have used 
differing rationales in adjudicating the same classes of claims.  This 
Section attempts to reconcile the methodology used by these courts 
and draws inferences about what types of constitutional claims may 
be jurisdictionally barred under current standards. 
All of the cases discussed agree on one central proposition:  claims 
which are wholly independent of those issues arising from removal 
proceedings should not be barred from adjudication in federal dis-
trict court.180  The disagreement and confusion in the cases discussed 
seems to center on which claims “arise from”—and what tests should 
be used to determine whether a claim “arises from”—a removal pro-
ceeding.181 
One of the more common types of constitutional claims that arise 
in contexts that would implicate immigration issues is the right to 
counsel, as exemplified in Aguilar, Arar, and Turkmen.182  Of these cas-
es, only the district court in Arar recognized the independence of 
right-to-counsel claims from the underlying removal proceedings.183  
The courts in Aguilar and Turkmen, in dismissing these claims as be-
ing barred by § 1252(b)(9), noted that the chief reason that such 
claims should not be brought in federal district court is that they can 
be administratively addressed within the immigration courts, i.e., that 
the BIA and immigration courts had jurisdiction to hear such claims, 
 
178 Id. (alteration in original) (citing Aguilar v. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforce-
ment, 510 F.3d 1, 13–14 (1st Cir. 2007).   
179 Id. 
180 E.g., Aguilar, 510 F.3d at 11; see also supra Section VII. 
181 Compare, e.g., Khorrami v. Rolince 493 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1067 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (finding no 
§ 1252(b)(9) jurisdictional bar on the grounds that no removal order had been issued), 
aff’d on other grounds 539 F.3d 782 (7th Cir. 2008), with Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 
250, 283 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (holding that claims challenging lack of counsel and the legality 
of removal to a country where torture was likely did not directly contest deportation, and 
therefore were not barred), aff’d on other grounds, 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009).  
182 See Aguilar, 510 F.3d at 7; Turkmen v. Ashcroft, No. 02 CV 2307, 2006 WL 1662663, at *1–
*2 (E.D.N.Y. June 14, 2006), rev’d on alternate grounds, 589 F.3d 542 (2d Cir. 2009); Arar, 
414 F. Supp. 2d at 257–58; see also supra Sections VII.A–C. 
183 Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 269; see also supra Section VII.B. 
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and that these claims were often brought to immigration court within 
the context of their removal proceedings.184  In contrast, Judge Trager 
found in Arar that since Arar’s right-to-counsel claim did not arise out 
of a challenge to his removal order, but instead out of a challenge to 
the legality of his rendition, these claims were not barred by 
§ 1252(b)(9).185 
Another common category of constitutional claims concerns the 
length of detention.  Both Turkmen and Khorrami examined slightly 
different claims and produced decisions that, while consistent in out-
come, diverged in analysis.  In Turkmen, the court analyzed claims 
protesting the government’s delay in issuing the plaintiffs’ NTAs, or 
protesting the time plaintiffs were held in detention, not from the 
standpoint of whether such claims are generated by the underlying 
removal proceeding but in terms of the purpose behind the govern-
ment’s actions.186  The Turkmen court found that since the govern-
ment’s delay in issuing the NTAs and the resulting lengthy detention 
were not done in furtherance of their removal, these actions could 
not be considered to have “arisen from” the underlying removal pro-
ceeding.187 
In contrast, the court in Khorrami considered the issue far more 
narrowly, deciding simply that the plaintiff’s claims objecting to the 
government’s post-NTA detention and pre-NTA interrogation and 
arrest were not barred because no order of removal had been is-
sued.188  Since § 1252(b)(9) only applies to claims arising from orders 
of removal, that section of the INA was held inapplicable in this con-
text.189  Since the plaintiffs in Turkmen were only challenging their de-
tention after a final order of removal had been issued, the court might 
have been able to use the same analysis as the Khorrami court in allow-
ing the claims to go forward in district court.190  Yet, the court chose 
to concentrate on the government’s intent in detaining and delaying 
the issuance of the NTAs.191 
The court in Turnbull used the same temporal analysis as the court 
in Khorrami to analyze whether the plaintiff’s claims protesting his 
 
184 Aguilar, 510 F.3d at 13–14; Turkmen, 2006 WL 1662663 at * 26; see also supra Sections 
VII.A, VII.C. 
185 Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 269; see also supra Section VII.B. 
186 Turkmen, 2006 WL 1662663 at *26; see also supra Section VII.C. 
187 Turkmen, 2006 WL 1662663 at *26; see also supra Section VII.C. 
188 Khorrami v. Rolince 493 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1067 (N.D. Ill. 2007); see also supra Section 
VII.C. 
189 Khorrami, 493 F. Supp. 2d at 1067; see supra Section VII.E; See also supra Section 6.E. 
190 Turkmen, 2006 WL 1662663 at *26–*27; see also supra Sections VII.C, VII.E. 
191 Turkmen, 2006 WL 1662663 at *26–*27; see also supra Section 6.E. 
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deportation to Jamaica (notwithstanding the magistrate’s stay order) 
were barred from consideration under § 1252(b)(9).192  Here, the 
court noted that, though an order of removal had been issued earlier 
in the case, the magistrate’s order staying the removal served to over-
ride the order of removal, restoring the plaintiff to a pre-order-of-
removal state.193  Therefore, like the Khorrami court, this court found 
that § 1252(b)(9) did not apply.194 
The Turkmen court also analyzed two, separate claims that were 
not examined by any of the other courts in the earlier examples:  (1) 
bond determination, and (2) communications blackouts.195  While 
the court found that the bond determination claim was barred by 
§ 1252(b)(9), it held that the claims against communications black-
outs could be brought properly in federal district court, but it used 
different rubrics to support these conclusions.196  In dismissing the 
bond determination claims, the court found that since the BIA could 
review appeals of issues arising from bond determination claims, such 
claims necessarily arose from the underlying order of removal and 
were therefore barred by § 1252(b)(9).197 
On the other hand, in accepting jurisdiction of the communica-
tions blackout claim, the same court looked to the purpose of the gov-
ernment’s actions.198  Because the government’s motives in instituting 
the actions to which the plaintiffs were objecting were distinct and 
entirely separate from those associated with removal, the court found 
that these claims did not arise from orders of removal and could be 
considered in federal district court.199 
Similarly, the Aguilar court also relied on varying rationales for al-
lowing the plaintiff’s conditions-of-confinement and family integrity 
claims to continue through the district court.200  In the conditions-of-
confinement analysis, the court relied on the same reasoning it had 
used in analyzing the right-to-counsel issue.201  It first asked whether 
the conditions-of-confinement claims could be handled efficaciously 
 
192 Turnbull v. United States, No. 1:06cv858, 2007 WL 2153279, at *5–*6 (N.D. Ohio July 23, 
2007); Khorrami, 493 F. Supp. 2d at 1067; see supra Sections VII.D and VII.E. 
193 Turnbull, 2007 WL 2153279 at *5–*6; see also supra Section VII.D. 
194 Turnbull, 2007 WL 2153279 at *6; Khorrami, 493 F. Supp. 2d at 1067; see also supra Section 
VII.D. 
195 Turkmen, 2006 WL 1662663 at *25–*26; see also supra Section VII.C. 
196 See Turkmen, 2006 WL 1662663 at *25–*26; see also supra Section VII.C. 
197 Turkmen, 2006 WL 1662663 at *25–*26; see also supra Section VII.C. 
198 Turkmen, 2006 WL 1662663 at *26; see also supra Section VII.C. 
199 Turkmen, 2006 WL 1662663 at *25–*26; see also supra Section VII.C. 
200 Aguilar v. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 510 F.3d 1, 13, 19 (1st Cir. 2007); 
see also supra Section VII.A. 
201 See Aguilar, 510 F.3d at 13; see also supra Section VII.A. 
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in the administrative context.202  Here, however, the answer was dif-
ferent:  the conditions-of-confinement claim could not have been 
properly addressed in immigration court and, absent an appropriate 
administrative forum, could not be barred by § 1252(b)(9).203 
In analyzing the family integrity claims, however, the Aguilar court 
relied on vastly different reasoning to determine that these claims 
could not be barred either.204  The court found that the family integr-
ity claims had only a “tenuous” link to the plaintiff’s removal and for 
that reason were not covered by § 1252(b)(9).205  The court made only 
passing mention of the standard it had used in analyzing the condi-
tions-of-confinement and right-to-counsel claims.206 
Finally, in a move that diverged from all of the previous case law, 
the court in Arias held, categorically, that all unreasonable search and 
seizure claims were barred from being brought in federal district 
court because such “claims [were] common in removal proceedings 
and could directly impact the plaintiff’s immigration status.”207  The 
court, however, did not adequately explain its meaning or illustrate 
the extent of the “impact” it perceived, and its decision seems diame-
trically opposed to all of the other cases examined above.208 
Ironically, the 1996 amendments to the INA complicated the judi-
cial scheme in an attempt to consolidate and simplify judicial review 
of aliens in removal proceedings.  The Supreme Court has provided 
little assistance in bringing clarity to this area of the law, leaving the 
courts of appeals and district courts to muddle through the statute’s 
text and legislative history in cases covering a wide expanse of consti-
tutional law.  The result has been a jurisprudence of confusion, with 
courts stating results but failing to provide an underlying theory.  As 
the cases surveyed show, each constitutional claim is analyzed in a va-
cuum, with courts making ad hoc judgments about whether that par-
ticular claim “arises from” an underlying order of removal.  Even 
within a particular case, a district court presented with multiple con-
stitutional claims sometimes uses different tests and rationales in de-
ciding whether § 1252(b)(9) is a bar.  This inconsistency has engen-
dered more confusion in other courts as they look to one another for 
 
202 See Aguilar, 510 F.3d at 13; see also supra Section VII.A. 
203 See Aguilar, 510 F.3d at 13; see also supra Section VII.A. 
204 See Aguilar, 510 F.3d at 19; see also supra Section VII.A. 
205 Aguilar, 510 F.3d at 19. 
206 Id. 
207 Arias v. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, No. 07-1959, 2008 WL 1827604 at 
*6 (D. Minn. Apr. 23, 2008) (holding, unlike every other case, that all Bivens claims are 
categorically barred by § 1252(b)(9)). 
208 Id.; see also supra Section VII.F. 
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guidance.  The result is a collage of high-level theories about what the 
statute means and how Congress intended for it to be applied, but no 
consistent underlying theory of how it should be applied in cases in-
volving constitutional claims. 
IX.  PROPOSED SOLUTION 
A.  Legal Scholarship 
Legal scholarship in this area is likewise lacking in guidance.  
While a great deal of work has concentrated on the implications of 
the recent amendments to the INA on habeas corpus jurisdiction in 
federal court,209 few scholars have examined how § 1252(b)(9) should 
be interpreted within the context of constitutional claims such as Bi-
vens claims.  Most notably, Professor Motomura offered an interpreta-
tion of § 1252(b)(9) that focused on a narrow reading of the provi-
sion.210  In support, he analogized the way the courts read phrases 
similar to “arising from” in other contexts and found that courts ap-
plying the federal question jurisdiction language of “arising under,” 
appellate jurisdiction language of “final decision,” and supplemental 
jurisdiction language of “case or controversy” all apply them narrow-
ly.211  In drawing these parallels, Motomura persuasively argues that 
the phrase “arising from” in the context of § 1252(b)(9) should also 
be interpreted narrowly.212 
In attempting to illustrate the possible application of the “signifi-
cant and independent” analysis to determine the interaction between 
the claims plaintiffs present and the underlying order of removal, 
Motomura suggested using the Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp. 
collateral order analysis.213  Unfortunately, the Cohen analysis often in-
 
209  See, e.g., David M. McConnell, Judicial Review Under the Immigration and Nationality Act:  Ha-
beas Corpus and the Coming of the REAL ID (1996–2005), 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 75 (2007); 
Gerald L. Neuman, On the Adequacy of Direct Review After the REAL ID Act of 2005, 51 N.Y.L. 
SCH. L. REV. 133 (2007); Peter Bibring, Jurisdictional Issues in Post-Removal Habeas Chal-
lenges to Orders of Removal, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 135 (2002); Gerald L. Neuman, Jurisidction 
and the Rule of Law After the 1996 Immigration Act, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1963 (2000); Matthew 
J. Droskoski, Criminal Aliens Get Pinched:  Sandoval v. Reno, AEDPA’s and IIRIRA’s Effect on 
Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction, 45 VILL. L. REV. 711 (2000). 
210 See generally Motomura, supra note 31 (arguing § 1252(b)(9) jurisdiction bars do not apply 
to the Federal Tort Claims Act or Bivens claims). 
211 Id. at 417–23. 
212 Id. at 414. 
213 Id. at 426; see also Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949) (allow-
ing for interlocutory appeals for a “small class [of orders] which finally determine claims 
of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to 
be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate con-
 
June 2010] IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT 1471 
 
volves case-by-case considerations that do not lend themselves to un-
iformity.  Furthermore, Motomura’s test does not flesh out in detail 
the method that courts should use to analyze whether these claims 
are separate and important, essentially presenting the same problem 
as the jurisdictional bar issue in immigration claims for which Moto-
mura offers the Cohen analysis as a solution.  Hence, the Cohen analy-
sis cannot provide courts with much extra guidance in analyzing the 
issues involved in the immigration cases—it merely presents a res-
tatement of the problem in an analogous context. 
Specifically, Motomura argues that the Federal Tort Claims Act 
and Bivens cases categorically do not “arise from” removal proceed-
ings.214  He contends that although these cases often contain claims 
that “relate to” removal proceedings, they do not “arise from” such 
proceedings.215  Therefore, they should categorically be treated as 
“significant and independent matters” for purposes of applying the 
jurisdictional bar of § 1252(b)(9).216  Unfortunately, as was demon-
strated in earlier sections, courts applying § 1252(b)(9) since Moto-
mura’s articulation of the appropriate scope of the rule have found 
that there are some constitutional claims that are barred by 
§ 1252(b)(9) and others that are not.217  Therefore, Motomura’s anal-
ysis, whatever its normative appeal, does not satisfactorily describe or 
explain the choices courts have actually made. 
Courts seem to be applying differing analyses to this question 
without an underlying theory, and scholars have been relatively reti-
cent in providing a theory of their own.  But certain patterns and 
goals have emerged from adjudicated cases that lend themselves to 
fashioning a theory for analysis that can be applied going forward, 
without severely damaging the precedential value of these cases. 
 
sideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated”).  Since Cohen, the Supreme 
Court has distilled these requirements and applies them to those district court decisions:  
(1) that are conclusive, (2) that resolve important questions completely separate from the 
merits, and (3) that would render such important questions effectively unreviewable on 
appeal from final judgment in the underlying action.  Digital Equipment Corp. v. Desk-
top Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 866-868 (1994).  Professor Motomura suggests using the 
same method of analysis as the second of the three requirements, the separate and im-
portant requirement, in the context of § 1252(b)(9) defenses as well. 
214 Motomura, supra note 31, at 431. 
215 Id. 
216 Id. 
217 See supra Section VII (discussing many courts’ bar of right-to-counsel claims and their 
mixed approaches to length-of-detention claims). 
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B.  A Different Approach 
As a threshold matter, courts should first determine, in terms of 
timing, whether § 1252(b)(9) applies at all in deciding if constitu-
tional claims should be barred from district court.  Section 
1252(b)(9) requires that the claim arise from a final order of remov-
al.218  The cases decided when read together with the statute seem to 
have created a window during which § 1252(b)(9) is applicable in 
deciding such claims.  The court in Turkmen found that pre-NTA in-
terrogation and arrest claims do not arise from an order of removal 
because the removal process starts with the NTA.219  Any action taken 
before an NTA is issued is not part of a removal proceeding.220  
Therefore, any action taken before an NTA is issued is not barred by 
§ 1252(b)(9).  As such, Turkmen described when the removal process 
begins.221  The court in Turnbull, on the other hand, helped clarify 
when the timeframe for possible consolidation ends.  The Turnbull 
court found that a stay to removal restarts the removal process.222  
Therefore, it can be inferred that the grant of a removal order and 
expiration of the time to appeal is the end of the timeframe—any ac-
tion that a plaintiff wants to challenge that takes place after a removal 
order has been entered is outside the requisite timeframe.  Taken to-
gether, Turkmen and Turnbull show that only those actions that take 
place after an NTA is issued and before a final order of removal has 
been entered can possibly be barred by § 1252(b)(9).  Any actions 
taken outside of this window are categorically not barred and can be 
brought in federal district court under the general federal jurisdic-
tion statute. 
After a court has answered this question, and if it determines that 
the action the plaintiff is challenging falls within the requisite time 
period, the court can then reach the merits of the government’s 
§ 1252(b)(9) defense.  In undertaking this analysis, the court must 
first decide whether the claim is one that is independent of the re-
moval process. 
The district court in Arar noted that immigration court proceed-
ings and BIA appeals are specialized, administrative functions that 
deal with a discrete set of judicial issues:  removal and deportation of 
 
218 See INA § 242(b)(9), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) (Supp. III 1998). 
219 Turkmen v. Ashcroft, No. 02 CV 2307, 2006 WL 1662663, at *26 (E.D.N.Y. June 14, 2006), 
rev’d on alternate grounds, 589 F.3d 542 (2d Cir. 2009). 
220 See id. 
221 See id. 
222 Turnbull v. United States, No. 1:06cv858, 2007 WL 2153279, at *5 (N.D. Ohio July 23, 
2007); see also supra Section VII.D. 
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non-citizens.223  As such, the jurisdiction of immigration courts is spe-
cialized, limited, and clear.  Immigration judges only hear cases that 
involve the Department of Homeland Security’s investigation and 
prosecution of a non-citizen’s presence in the United States.224  The 
only issues an immigration judge can decide are those that arise while 
the immigration courts administratively regulate issues of deportation 
or removal.225  This certainly does not mean that the only issues that 
are of interest to immigration judges are decisions to remove an 
alien.  However, immigration judges have decided issues that are not 
linked to the substance of the court’s decision to remove an alien 
when these issues concern the process by which a court makes its re-
moval decision.  Examples of issues in which such concerns are im-
plicated are in the areas of bond determinations, detention, and the 
right to counsel.226  Indeed, claims of improper bond determination, 
detention, and access to counsel come about only as a result of pro-
cedural shortcomings during the removal process.  They do not ad-
dress any substantive claims, which are usually the bases of a court’s 
decision to remove.  Therefore, immigration courts rely on substan-
tive issues to make their removal decisions and have jurisdiction over 
only those procedural claims that come about as a result of the re-
moval determinations.  Immigration courts do not have jurisdiction 
over procedural claims that do not come about as a result of removal 
decisions, nor do they have jurisdiction over non-removal substantive 
claims. 
Since the immigration courts have jurisdiction only over claims 
that involve substantive issues regarding removal or procedural issues 
arising out of the process of removal, these claims are clearly “inex-
tricably linked” to the removal process and thus well within St. Cyr’s 
definition of the scope of § 1252(b)(9).227  Hence, all claims that can 
be brought to immigration court must be brought there (and not to a 
federal district court), and, by virtue of § 1252(b)(9), those claims are 
subject to review only in the courts of appeals. 
 
223 Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 280 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (“[T]he INA deals overwhel-
mingly with the admission, exclusion and removal of aliens—almost all of whom seek to 
remain within this country until their claims are fairly resolved.”).  See supra Section VII.B. 
224 Executive Office for Immigration Review, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Board of Immigration 
Appeals, http://www.justice.gov/eoir/biainfo.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2010).   
225 Executive Office for Immigration Review, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, General Overview of Jurisdic-
tion of the Courts, IMMIGRATION JUDGE BENCHBOOK, http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/ 
benchbook/resources/criminal/1_jurisdiction.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2010).   
226 See supra Section VII. 
227 See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 313–14 (2001); see also supra Section VI.B. 
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What about claims (such as Bivens claims) that cannot be brought 
in immigration court, but involve circumstances surrounding removal 
proceedings and in that attenuated sense “arise from” removal or-
ders?  Are they, too, barred by § 1252(b)(9)?  If the immigration 
courts do not have the ability to offer the remedy being sought by 
that particular claim, it cannot have arisen from a removal proceed-
ing and is thus not barred by § 1252(b)(9). 
The converse is true as well:  if a claim cannot be brought in im-
migration court, it does not deal substantively or procedurally with 
removal.  Hence, if a court finds that a claim cannot be brought in 
the immigration court, it is not procedurally or substantively tied to 
removal proceedings, does not “arise from” the underlying order of 
removal, and is thus not barred by § 1252(b)(9).  This conclusion is 
particularly important because it ensures that individuals have the 
ability to sue for constitutional grievances:  if individuals were unable 
to bring claims in both immigration and district courts, they will have 
no opportunity to seek redress for these wrongs at all. 
Tying all of these components together, courts must ask two ques-
tions before deciding whether a constitutional claim is barred by 
§ 1252(b)(9):  (1) did the claim arise from actions taken after an 
NTA was issued, but before a final order of removal; and (2) can the 
claim be brought in immigration court?  If the answer to both of 
these questions is yes, then § 1252(b)(9) bars the claim from being 
considered in district court.  If the answer to either one of these ques-
tions is no, then § 1252(b)(9) does not bar such claims from being 
considered in federal district court. 
The virtues of this analysis are embodied in certainty and unifor-
mity.  The current lack of standardization in the manner in which 
federal courts apply the jurisdictional bar inevitably leads to both 
false positive and false negative results.  In the case of false positives 
(for example, Arias),228 claims that should continue in federal district 
court have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, thereby eliminat-
ing the plaintiff’s ability to obtain relief for the alleged violations.  On 
the other hand, some claims, like the right-to-counsel claims in 
Arar,229 that should be dismissed because of the plaintiff’s ability to 
properly seek relief in the administrative context could continue in 
federal district court, clogging the dockets and frustrating the intent 
of Congress by performing end-runs around the goal of consolida-
 
228 See Arias v. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, No. 07-1959, 2008 WL 1827604, 
at *6 (D. Minn. Apr. 23, 2008). 
229 See Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 269 (E.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d on other grounds, 585 
F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009). 
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tion.  Both outcomes weaken the fabric of the judiciary with poor re-
sults. 
The solution proposed here will help judges decrease the number 
of false positives and negatives and allow plaintiffs a clear sense of 
which courts are most appropriate for filing their claims of constitu-
tional violations.  While there are many possible solutions that might 
increase uniformity—indeed, bright-line rules, such as the one pro-
posed by the Arias court,230 are arguably more effective in creating 
clear standards—the virtue of the solution proposed here is that it 
ensures plaintiffs have a venue in which they may bring their claims, 
without being dismissed for want of jurisdiction. 
Of foremost importance is that plaintiffs who have been wronged 
should be able to obtain recovery, particularly for violations of fun-
damental rights that arise out of the Constitution.  Allowing such 
plaintiffs a defined venue for bringing such claims ensures that their 
constitutional rights are protected. 
The solution proposed here also ensures that the adjudicatory 
process is streamlined:  those courts that have the most expertise in 
the administrative context (immigration courts) hear those cases in-
volving their area of expertise.  All other claims are heard and adju-
dicated, but by courts of general subject-matter jurisdiction.  This 
streamlined procedure produces the most efficient mechanism for 
allowing plaintiffs to recover for constitutional grievances. 
In order to illustrate how this analytical structure might function 
in federal district courts, it is beneficial to apply this analysis to the 
cases already discussed.  While most of the outcomes will remain the 
same, when examined in the aggregate this new analytical structure 
will achieve better comity. 
X.  TEACHING OLD CASES NEW ANALYSES 
A.  Claims for Monetary Relief 
Claims for monetary relief, like Bivens claims, are a class of cases 
that are categorically not barred by § 1252(b)(9).  Since immigration 
courts cannot award damages, claims that seek monetary relief can-
 
230 See Arias, 2008 WL 1827604, at *6 (holding § 1252 bars all Fourth and Fifth Amendment 
claims because they are “common in removal proceedings and could directly im-
pact . . . immigration status”); see also supra Section VII.F. 
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not be brought there.231  Such claims therefore fail the second prong 
of the analysis, since plaintiffs cannot obtain relief for these claims in 
immigration court.  Therefore, such claims must be brought in fed-
eral district court. 
In Arar, since Arar’s claims did not seek an adjustment of removal, 
but only monetary damages under Bivens, which an immigration 
court cannot award, his claims cannot effectively be brought there.232  
Therefore, the district courts cannot be divested of their jurisdiction 
to hear his case, and § 1252(b)(9) should not bar Arar’s Bivens claims 
from being heard in federal district court.  Similarly, district courts 
should not bar Turnbull’s, Khorrami’s, and Arias’ claims either, as 
they, too, were seeking monetary relief.233 
B.  Right-to-Counsel Claims 
Since right-to-counsel claims arising out of actions taken after an 
NTA is issued, but before a final order of removal, can be brought in 
immigration court, these claims should be barred by § 1252(b)(9).  
Both the Aguilar and Turkmen courts used this precise rationale in de-
termining that these claims should be barred, though they did not 
formally go through the first temporal step of the analysis.234 
C.  Length-of-Detention and NTA-Related Claims 
Using the proposed analysis, claims that protest the length of de-
tention between the filing of an NTA and final order of removal 
should be barred by § 1252(b)(9) since these claims can be brought 
in immigration court.  However, if a plaintiff files suit citing unrea-
sonable pre-NTA detention or delay, as the plaintiffs did in Turkmen, 
this claim must fall outside the scope of § 252(b)(9).235 
 
231 Executive Office for Immigration Review, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, General Overview of Jurisdic-
tion of the Courts, IMMIGRATION JUDGE BENCHBOOK, http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/
benchbook/resources/criminal/1_jurisdiction.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2010). 
232 See Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 258. 
233 See Arias, 2008 WL 1827604, at *4; Turnbull v. United States, No. 1:06cv858, 2007 WL 
2153279, at *1 (N.D. Ohio July 23, 2007); Khorrami v. Rolince 493 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 
1064 (N.D. Ill. 2007). 
234 See Aguilar v. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 510 F.3d 1, 13–14 (1st Cir. 
2007); Turkmen v. Ashcroft, No. 02 CV 2307, 2006 WL 1662663, at *26 (E.D.N.Y. June 
14, 2006), rev’d on alternate grounds, 589 F.3d 542 (2d Cir. 2009). 
235 See Turkmen, 2006 WL 1662663, at *26. 
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D.  Bond Determination and Communication Blackouts 
Under the new analysis, since the BIA may review appeals of issues 
arising from bond determination, the immigration courts can, and 
therefore should, have jurisdiction over these claims.  This was, in 
fact, the rationale offered by the Turkmen court.236  However, the op-
posite is true for the communications blackout claims.  Since these 
claims are usually not of the kind that are adjudicated by immigration 
courts, such claims should not be barred by § 1252(b)(9).  In Turk-
men, the reasons for allowing these claims to go forward were two-
fold:  (1) the communications blackout occurred before an NTA was 
issued, and thus fell outside the scope of § 1252(b)(9); and (2) even 
if a communications blackout had taken place after the issuance of an 
NTA, this claim would still not be barred by § 1252(b)(9) because it is 
not the type of claim over which immigration judges have jurisdic-
tion.237 
E.  Conditions of-Confinement and Family Integrity 
Turning to the First Circuit’s consideration of Aguilar’s condi-
tions-of-confinement claims, the analysis here closely follows the anal-
ysis of the court in that case.  Since these claims cannot be raised ef-
fectively in immigration courts, these claims should not be barred 
from consideration in federal district court.238  In Aguilar, the First 
Circuit uses a similar rubric to achieve the same result.  However, its 
treatment of the family integrity claims is much different:  the court 
cites the tenuous link that the family integrity claims had with the fi-
nal order of removal to find that these claims were not barred.239  Us-
ing the new analysis, however, it is clear that family integrity issues 
are, in general, not the business of immigration courts.  Since immi-
gration courts do not adjudicate claims of family integrity, these 
claims should not be barred by § 1252(b)(9). 
X.  CONCLUSION 
There has been a great deal of tension between different circuits 
in deciding how and when to apply § 1252(b)(9).  While many of the 
outcomes can be reconciled, the manner in which courts reach these 
outcomes varies widely from court to court, offering other courts and 
 
236 See id. at *25–*26. 
237 See id. 
238 See Aguilar, 510 F.3d at 12–13. 
239 See id. at 19. 
1478 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 12:5 
 
potential plaintiffs little guidance in determining whether certain 
claims should be barred from being brought in federal district court.  
The solution proposed here, suggesting that federal courts use a two-
step process that first examines whether the plaintiff’s claim involves 
actions that arise out of an order of removal, and then examines 
whether such a claim can be effectively reviewed in immigration 
court, offers courts and individuals a clear guide to determine this 
question.  This solution offers an optimal combination of judicial ef-
ficiency in barring claims that should properly be brought in the ad-
ministrative setting (as dictated by Congressional intent when it 
passed the IIRIRA), while offering every plaintiff alleging a constitu-
tional wrong the opportunity to have his or her case adjudicated in 
court.  For these reasons, courts should adopt the solution proposed 
and implement a fair and uniform method for determining whether 
certain constitutional and Bivens claims are barred from district court 
by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
